Dimensions of Genocide: The Circumplex Model Meets Violentization Theory

Mark A. Winton
University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida

The purpose of this study is to examine the use of Olson’s (1995, 2000) family therapy based circumplex model and Athens’ (1992, 1997, 2003) violentization theory in explaining genocide. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 is used as a case study. Published texts, including interviews with perpetrators, research reports, human rights reports, and court transcripts were analyzed. The use of both theories was consistent with the data and resulted in a greater understanding of the genocide. Rwanda moved to a rigidly enmeshed society during the genocide with the perpetrators going through the violentization process. Suggestions for further research are provided. Key Words: Genocide, Circumplex Model, Violentization Theory, and Rwanda

Introduction

Genocides have continued to occur despite international intervention. The primary purpose of my work is to present two approaches that may be used to understand genocide. I decided to use the Rwandan genocide as a case study for several reasons: first, the Rwandan genocide is documented in professional journals, books, monographs, and court transcripts; second, the genocide occurred recently; third, intervention by other countries was absent; and fourth, the genocide occurred over a short period of time.

There is a lack of research on genocide in the criminological field that makes it difficult to develop theories (Morrison, 2004). Yacoubian (2000) showed that criminologists have neglected presentations of genocides at professional conferences, in the professional journals, and in academic criminology departments leading Day and Vandiver (2000) to recommend incorporation of genocide studies into the criminal justice field. Yacoubian explained the neglect of genocide in criminological research as a result of: lack of funding, research method limitations, research focus on local events, and educational deficits about genocide. Day and Vandiver have pointed out that criminological theory does apply to genocide.

My interest in developing a research area and course focusing on genocide occurred in 2001 after I recognized that there were few genocide courses available from criminal justice departments. I had primarily been teaching graduate students who worked in law enforcement and corrections, and I developed an elective graduate course called, Criminal Justice Perspectives on Genocide. The objectives of the course were to critically examine theories of genocide from multidisciplinary perspectives, to apply evidence based data to understanding the precursors of genocide, to compare and contrast several case studies of genocide, to examine critically the organizational features of genocide, to analyze the roles that criminal justice majors may play in studying and preventing genocide, and to interpret and critique the ethical and legal issues criminal
justice workers face. I have taught this course several times, both in the face to face format and completely online.

One frustrating aspect of teaching this course is the lack of criminal justice-related theories on genocide. I conducted qualitative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) on accounts of the Rwandan genocide to assess the use of the circumplex theory from family therapy (Olson, 1995, 2000) and the criminological based violentization theory (Athens, 2003). Applying these two theories to the 1994 Rwandan genocide allows both structural and agency dimensions of the genocide to be addressed. In this study, an attempt is made to focus on the structural characteristics of the society by using the circumplex model and the agency factors using the violentization theory. If the theory provides an adequate fit with the data, future research can be conducted by comparing additional genocides with the theories in order to validate this approach. Following Porter’s (2006) recommendations for theoretical and contextual research, I will provide a general theory of genocide that may be refined to address similarities and differences between genocides, and approaches which may increase our ability to assess genocidal risk factors. The primary goal is to trace the process of how a society becomes structured and supportive of genocidal behavior and how individual perpetrators explain how and why they commit genocide.

There has been a long history of debate over structure versus agency explanations of genocide, which has led to models with a focus on one or the other. In discussing the Holocaust, Moses (1998) pointed out that the “definition of intention requires the balanced consideration of the agency (ideology) of the perpetrators and the structures (circumstances) in which they operated” (p. 218). In other words, we cannot understand genocides with one dimension; therefore we need to address both structure and agency. I view both structure and agency as important factors that are interrelated. Criminological theory textbooks contain a multitude of perspectives to address structural and agency dimensions of criminal activity. For example, texts usually contain chapters on biology and crime, psychology and crime, crime control theories, and social structure theories. While the biological and psychological are based on agency, or how individuals make decisions and behave, the structural approaches are used to direct attention to the economy, education, political system, and other institutions. Perhaps these theories do not offer an adequate explanation of genocide when used alone: There is a need for an approach that one may use to addresses both individual behavior and social conditions (Porter, 2006; Turner, 2005).

Berger (1995) used an agency-structure framework to examine two brothers’ survival during the Holocaust. Berger stated, “This life history study of two brothers’ survival affords opportunities to examine the relationship between human agency and social structure, one of the central problems of general social theory” (p. 30). In a similar way, Porter (2006) suggested a two-step theory of genocide in which a group’s genocidal ideology leads to bureaucracy. Thus, by focusing on structural and agency aspects of the genocide, a more comprehensive approach could be developed.

The Circumplex Model

The first theoretical approach is derived from the family therapy circumplex model of family functioning that focuses on cohesion, flexibility, and communication
The main assumption of the circumplex model, which has been extensively studied and applied to family therapy, education, and research over the past 25 years, is that balanced families function better than those who exhibit characteristics and patterns that appear to unbalance the families (Olson & Gorall, 2003). Families have various levels of communication skills and patterns that affect their functioning and levels of cohesion and flexibility (Olson & Gorall). Families, who are balanced on their levels of cohesion and flexibility, and have adequate communication skills, are more likely to demonstrate healthy patterns of behavior (Olson, 2000). In addition, the circumplex model of family functioning is a dynamic model allowing one to trace changes over time.

In order to explain genocide, I used the circumplex model at the structural level with a focus on organizations and social groups instead of families (Winton, 2005). Social groups with high (chaotic) or low (rigid) levels of flexibility and high (enmeshed) or low (disengaged) levels of cohesion are at increased risk for a variety of social problems (Winton). Social groups that are balanced on their levels of cohesion and flexibility are more likely to have lower levels of societal problems (Winton). Coser (1956) stated that, “each way of meeting an outside threat contains a special danger: too much rigidity may lead to splits and withdrawals; too much flexibility may lead to a blurring of boundaries and dissolution in the surrounding environment” (pp. 96-97).

Cohesion, or levels of emotional closeness, range from very low or disengaged to very high or enmeshed (Olson, 1995, 2000; Olson & DeFrain, 1997). Enmeshed cohesion is demonstrated by a high level of emotional closeness within the perpetrator groups. In this type of cohesion, perpetrators describe their group as “one big family.” Group loyalty is also required through strong connections and identification among the perpetrators; a great deal of perpetrator dependency on one another is present. Deviations from the expected behaviors are often punished.

Disengaged cohesion is characterized by a pattern of perpetrator emotional distance. In this pattern, perpetrators show high levels of independence and fail to demonstrate group loyalty. In the disengaged cohesion pattern, failure to follow the perpetrator group has minimal negative consequences.

Friedkin (2004) recommends that “theories of social cohesion should be grounded on the explanation of individuals’ group membership attitudes and behaviors, but they must also account for the distribution of members’ attitudes and behaviors in a group” (p. 42). The circumplex model can be applied at various levels of scale, although the model was developed for family assessment and therapy, applications to communities or societies are feasible.

Flexibility, or the ability for a system to respond to change or crisis, ranges from very low or rigid to very high or chaotic (Olson, 1995, 2000; Olson & DeFrain, 1997). Rigidity is present when perpetrator leaders use an authoritarian style of leadership to strictly enforce rules, rigid thinking patterns, and high levels of social control of others. Another indicator of a rigid group/organization is the inability to change when confronting a crisis.

Conversely, too much change in response to a stressor or crisis leads to a variety of problems. Chaotic flexibility is characterized by minimal control over others by the perpetrator leaders, whose leadership and leadership styles may change rapidly. In cases
of chaotic flexibility, patterns of social control are low and rules are not enforced. Thought patterns are diverse and disorganized.

Justification for violence through various communication methods is used. These may include the use of radio, television, newspapers, and community leaders. In the Rwandan genocide, radio broadcasts were used to instruct the perpetrators to kill. Political speeches may also be used to provide justifications for genocidal behavior.

In my study of 13 separate 20th century genocides (Winton, 2005), by using the circumplex model, I was able to describe how genocidal societies moved toward unbalanced levels of cohesion and flexibility, falling into the rigid and enmeshed pattern. The perpetrator group formed highly cohesive interactions with each other and their societal institutions, as group loyalty became important for the functioning of the group. Speaking out against the group could lead to prison, torture, and death. With this rigid leadership pattern, the perpetrator group exerted high levels of social control.

Missing from my 2005 study was an agency dimension of social interaction. In order to address the agency dimensions of the Rwandan genocide, I apply Lonnie Athens’ (2003) theory of violentization.

**Violentization Theory**

Athens’ (2003) theory of violentization is based on symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionism takes social interaction, the self, role taking, and the meanings of symbols as the main foci (Charon, 1989; Cohen, 1981; Longmore, 1998; Mead, 1977). Symbolic interactionism is based on the idea that people act based on meanings, which derive from interaction with others, and are interpreted by the individual (Blumer, 1969). For example, people who act in violent ways learn how to be violent from other people who provide social norms and context-specific scripts. People define situations and act based on those definitions (Cohen).

Athens (2003) developed his theory through detailed interviews with individuals who have engaged in violent behavior. According to Athens (1997), we need an interpretative approach that focuses on the “recognition that violent criminal action is situated and that operates on a model of the violent criminal as an actor” (pp. 25-26). Athens (1997) pointed out that this approach is rarely used in criminological research because it constitutes a challenge to the criminological research and theory status quo. In addition, “the interpretative approach assumes that criminals’ actions are a product of the individuals’ interpretations of these situations, which past experiences always influence in important ways but never completely determine” (Athens, 1997, p. 116). The emphasis is on how the actor makes sense of his or her actions. Like the circumplex model, violentization theory is used by researchers to address developmental processes of behavior. Athens (2003) presented this developmental approach with the following four stages of the violentization process.

- **Brutalization**- This stage involves the teaching and demonstration of violent behavior, which includes threatening to use physical force, observing the use of physical force, and learning how to use physical force. In the case of genocide, this stage consists of preparing individuals and groups to act violently against a specific group. Part of the process involves constructing the genocidal script (e.g.,
economic, threat, or terror). For example, perpetrator leaders define the victim group as a serious threat.

- **Defiance**- In this stage, the leaders of the genocide enforce and implement their belief system to justify the use of violence. The perpetrators define a group as a threat that needs to be eradicated, and the individual learns that violence is an alternative to these perceived threats.

- **Violent Dominant Engagements**- This stage focuses on threatening others and using violent behavior. In this stage, the individuals and groups are directed to use violence against a group or groups based on the perpetrator belief system to include segregating the victims, putting the victims in prison, torturing the victims, and committing homicidal acts by small groups.

- **Virulence**- In this stage, the genocide is in operation. The person or group has defined themselves as violent or dangerous. This includes the individual within the group successfully presenting him/herself as a violent and powerful person. According to Hinton (1998), “to generate genocidal behaviors, sociopolitical changes must be accompanied by a violent ideology” (p. 117). The shooting down of the Rwandan president’s plane was used as a starting point for a genocide that had been planned and organized for several years.

Violentization theory is consistent with Milgram’s (1974) learned predispositions for obedience, bonding, and strain reduction. Obedient participants who identify with those promoting violence through coaching and reinforcement may begin to identify themselves as violent and dangerous individuals (Milgram; Zimbardo, 2007). The power of the situation, with the removal of external constraints may lead nonviolent individuals to engage in violent behavior. Through the violentization process, the perpetrators are exposed to violence in a progressive desensitization manner to include rewards for engaging in violent behavior and sanctions for refusing to act violently (Kressel, 2002).

**Types of Genocide**

Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) define genocide as “a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator” (p. 23). Chalk and Jonassohn described the four types of genocides as; elimination of a threat, spread of terror, economic gain, and implementation of ideology. Lemarchand (2004b) classified the Rwandan case as a threat or retributive genocide.

Although genocides often occur during wars, having a war is not a necessary condition for genocide to occur. This has been clearly demonstrated by Bartrop (2002) who identified genocides that occurred without the presence of war. However, war, revolutions, and ethnic conflict facilitate the violentization process. Harff (2003) presented a structural model of the antecedents of genocide consisting of genocides and politicides since 1955. Harff noted that most genocides occurred during times of internal wars, revolutions, or regime collapses/changes with risk factors including political upheaval (e.g., violent conflict), prior genocides (habituation to mass killings), exclusionary ideologies, autocratic rule, ethnic cleavages, and low trade openness.
Fein (1993) compared two ideological genocides; Indonesia (1965-1966) and Cambodia (1975-1979). Although different dynamics were present, both countries experienced multiple crises. Fein demonstrated how the moral exclusion, blaming the victim, and patrons’ tolerance were used during these genocides. Fein pointed out that war and genocide are related and that war allows society to release aggression, address grievances, and hide the genocide through labeling the victim the enemy. Charny (1991) provided a model that has similarities to Athens' (2003) model and includes factors such as, dehumanization of a victim group, perception of the victim group as dangerous, availability of a victim group, and legitimation of the victim group by leaders.

Dutton, Boyanowsky, and Bond (2005) suggested that situational factors, as opposed to predispositional factors, explain genocide. In other words, genocidal behavior is situational or context-specific. In discussing the Holocaust, Mann (2000) stated that, “perpetrators were embedded in institutional sub-cultures already favorable to tough physical, legal, and biological remedies for social ills years before genocide was initiated” (p. 351). In their discussion of situation analysis of crime and deviance, Birkbeck and LaFree (1993) stated that researchers should explore interactions between perpetrators and situations and opportunities to engage in criminal activity.

**The Rwandan Genocide**

Before discussing the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, it is necessary to address briefly the 1972 genocide in Burundi. In 1972, 200,000-300,000 Hutus were killed by the government-controlled Tutsi after a small Hutu insurgency (Lemarchand, 2004a). The Tutsi military killed the Hutu men, while the Tutsi civilians killed women and children with youth militias serving as auxiliary forces and assisting the army with the genocide. Lemarchand stated that,

because ethnic memories transcend geographical boundaries, it is impossible to grasp the regional underpinnings of the 1994 Rwanda genocide unless we appreciate the fact that the horrors of 1972 are permanently lodged in the collective consciousness of all Hutu, in Rwanda and in Burundi. (p. 165)

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which occurred during a civil war, led to the deaths of over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus by extremist Hutus (Power, 2002). The goal of each genocide was the extermination of an ethnic group. Thus we have a case of double or mutual genocide, where the Tutsi committed genocide against the Hutu in Burundi and, 22 years later, the Hutu committed genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda (Kressel, 2002). According to Dadrian (2004), “the cyclical character of the atrocities created the requisite dynamics for this phenomenon of role-reversals and interchangeability of roles” (p. 510).

After the 1993 assassination of the Hutu president of Burundi, “a more virulent form of extremism emerged, in the form of Hutu Power” (Lemarchand, 2004b, p. 209). The Hutus, who opposed Hutu Power, were killed during the genocide (Gourevitch, 1998). The active genocide started with the assassination of the Rwandan president in
1994. The military and the interahamwe (grass-roots youth wing) carried out most of the killings (Lemarchand, 2004b).

In order to address how and why genocides occur, several assumptions shaped my research process. First, I believe that both structural and agency approaches are needed to understand genocide. Second, I tentatively classify Rwanda as a rigidly enmeshed society during the genocide, based on previous research on the characteristics of 13 genocides that included Rwanda (Winton, 2005). Assessment of this classification is further addressed in the current study. Third, I believe that there are sufficient secondary sources to determine whether the circumplex and violentization models help to explain the Rwandan genocide.

Methods

I selected published texts that provided quotations and interpretations of interviews with perpetrators and analysis of variables related to the Rwandan genocide. These texts contained information about how the perpetrators and other actors construct, account, describe, interpret, and explain their understanding of their actions (Berg, 2007; Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Feldman, 1995; Gergen, 1985; Weber, 1985).

Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Shenton (2004) suggested methods to assess trustworthiness (credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability) of the data. I addressed issues of credibility by using accepted content analytic strategies, searching multiple sources of perpetrator reports, analyzing previous research findings, looking for negative cases, and presenting the research for peer review. I could only find one other qualitative study in which the researcher linked violentization theory to a genocide (Rhodes, 2002), one quantitative study that I conducted earlier using the circumplex model by analyzing 13 genocides (Winton, 2005), and our Bosnian study in which we used the circumplex model and violentization theory (Winton & Unlu, 2008). Dependability was addressed through the presentation of the specific data collection procedures. In regards to confirmability, I was looking for accounts that supported the violentization and circumplex model. Directed qualitative content analytic procedures were used to analyze how the collected data fit within the two theoretical models (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Directed qualitative content analysis is a method used in which the researcher develops a coding scheme prior to analysis. I coded the data by using the circumplex model and violentization theory variables.

Data Sources

One of the primary resources for this study was French journalist Jean Hatzfeld’s (2003) analysis of his interviews with 10 men who were convicted and sentenced to jail for their participation in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This source was selected as it is one of the few accounts of interviews with Rwandan perpetrators. Few studies have been published that help us understand how the perpetrators made sense of their participation in the genocide. With the cooperation of the Rwandan government, Hatzfeld conducted his interviews inside the prison on an individual basis using a translator when needed. He promised the prisoners that he would not publish any of their accounts of the genocide.
until their legal issues had been resolved and their cases closed. The prisoners did receive rewards for their participation (e.g., supplies and news from their families).

In reviewing this book, Dudai (2006) stated, “what transpires is a phenomenology of genocide from the perspective of its immediate perpetrators, painfully unmediated” (p. 700). These 10 men ranged in age from 22 to 62. Some were married and had children. Their occupations were those of farmers, soccer player, mason, and teacher. Some were involved with Hutu politics. These men were quite candid in their recollections of the genocide and explanations of how and why it happened.

In addition, I analyzed convicted Rwandan perpetrator interviews conducted by Straus (2006). Straus interviewed over 200 prisoners in 15 prisons, asking them questions about their belief systems, how they became participants in the genocide, and why and how they engaged in violent behavior during the genocide.

Since research in these areas is usually found in different journals and texts, multiple databases and texts were consulted. The databases reviewed for this study included: Criminal Justice Abstracts, Academic Search Premier (EBSCO HOST), Dissertation Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, JSTOR, Political Science Abstracts, PsychINFO, SAGE Full text-collections, Sociological Abstracts, Anthropology Plus, Human Rights Watch reports and African Rights reports. Keywords used were Circumplex, Violentization, and Rwanda and Genocide.

Through the use of the multiple data bases, additional sources were included to augment the multiple dimensions of the Rwandan genocide. These sources included political speech reports (Verwimp, 2000), radio broadcast reports (Fujii, 2004; Kellow & Steeves, 1998; Li, 2004), reports from interviews with perpetrators (Hinton, 1998; Mironko, 2004; Straus, 2006), victim reports (Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1998; Jones, 2002), and court transcripts. Additionally, comparative studies of genocide (Dutton, et al., 2005; Fein, 1993; Kressel, 2002; Power, 2002) and book reviews were reviewed.

I did not find any articles in which the researcher specifically focused on the Rwandan genocide and the circumplex model or violentization theory. I did find one author who addressed violentization theory and the Holocaust (Rhodes, 2002), and I used my article on genocides and the circumplex model published in conference proceedings (Winton, 2005). The case study method provided by Rhodes’ application of violentization theory was used as one model for this analysis. According to Rhodes, “violent-socialization model supplies an evidence-based instrument through which to view the Third Reich, and specifically the Einsatzgruppen, that may help to illuminate their history and thus the history of the Holocaust” (p. 27). This allowed Rhodes to trace how these police battalions became violentized units of killers.

**Data Analysis**

Hsieh and Shannon (2005) define qualitative content analysis as, “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (p. 1278). My goal was to determine whether I could explain the genocide by using the theoretical approaches. I used a directed content analysis approach, in which the initial coding scheme is determined before analysis based on previous research and theory. I used the
theoretical variables from the circumplex and violentization theories, and coded the text as I read it; the definitions and examples of each of these variables are discussed below. Through careful readings of the text, I looked for indicators of the circumplex model and violentization variables by examining the narratives contained in the data sources. First, each text was read to determine whether information regarding perpetrator actions were present. Second, sections of the texts were highlighted and coded using the circumplex and violentization theory categories (Carpenter, 2002; Feldman, 1995; Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Weber, 1985).

After reading and coding the texts related to violentization theory and the circumplex model, I constructed a matrix to organize the themes. For example, circumplex and violentization themes were coded from each chapter in Hatzfeld’s (2003) text by perpetrator. Using this method, I was able to compare and contrast the perpetrator statements concerning how the genocide was organized, the experience of the first kill, reactions to the ongoing killings, punishment, and consequences of the genocide. Negative exemplars were also collected and noted. For example, there was conflicting information in Hatzfeld’s study on whether or not the perpetrators would face negative consequences for refusing to participate in the genocide.

Indicators of enmeshed cohesion include excessive emotional closeness, such as feeling like family with strangers, being highly dependent on the perpetrator group, being punished for dissenting thoughts or behaviors, adhering to a strict decision-making process, and pledging loyalty to the perpetrator group. Statements such as “we were like a family” were coded as enmeshed cohesion, and group loyalty was demonstrated in the enmeshed pattern by requiring strong connections and identification between the perpetrators. In the enmeshed cohesion group pattern, deviations from the expected behaviors were punished. For example, perpetrators reporting that they would be killed if they did not follow the orders to kill were coded as being in an enmeshed pattern. This pattern also is characterized by a great deal of perpetrator dependency on each other, a pattern also found in my study of 13 20th century genocides (Winton, 2005).

Disengaged cohesion consisted of a pattern of perpetrator emotional distance. In this pattern, perpetrators showed high levels of independence and failed to demonstrate group loyalty. Statements such as “we stayed away from each other” would be coded as disengaged cohesion. In the disengaged cohesion pattern, failure to follow the perpetrator group had minimal negative consequences. For example, the perpetrator group may tell others that they may make a choice to participate or not participate in the killing.

Indicators of rigidity include authoritarian leadership style from the perpetrator leaders, following a strict code of conduct without room for deviations, having strict and rigid roles to carry out, and following a set of strict rules and regulations. For example, statements such as “one must do whatever our leader says without question” would be coded as rigid flexibility. Rules were strictly enforced and rigid thinking patterns were encouraged with high levels of social control of others. Another indicator of a rigid group/organization was the inability to change when confronting a crisis with perpetrator roles remaining constant.

Chaotic flexibility was present when perpetrator leaders had minimal control over others. Leadership and leadership styles would change rapidly. Statements such as “nobody listens to these so called leaders” would be coded as chaotic flexibility. In these
cases, patterns of social control were low and rules were not enforced, thought patterns diverse and disorganized. Too much change in response to a stressor or crisis led to a variety of problems.

Patterns of communication that encourage genocidal behavior were also described. These included radio, television, newspapers, and community leaders. Statements from radio broadcasts such as “we must kill all of the Tutsi” would be coded as genocidal communication patterns.

For violentization theory, the four stages of the violentization process (Athens, 2003) were coded as follows. Indicators of brutalization included perpetrators reporting that they witnessed violence, that they were shown how to use violence, and that they were instructed that they had a personal responsibility to use violence. Indicators of defiance included statements indicating that violence is appropriate in specific situations. Indicators of violent dominant engagements included putting violent acts to the test. Indicators of virulency included perpetrators defining themselves as dangerous killers and receiving group or community support for their violent actions.

One of the primary limitations of directed content analysis is approaching the data with biases (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). I had already developed the codes and expectations of what I might find in the data. This led to a risk of finding “supportive” data as well as finding new and emerging patterns. I addressed this bias by presenting any contradictions or inconsistencies in the data and providing details about the data sources that would allow others to cross check or reanalyze the data. Multiple sources were used in order to cross-validate and reduce the risk of bias from relying on one major source. In addition, two colleagues reviewed the original manuscript and offered comments and feedback regarding how well the theories and data fit.

In summary, I followed the steps for directed qualitative content analysis as outlined by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) to determine whether the two theories were supported by the data. First, I defined the codes using the circumplex model and violentization theory categories. Second, I carefully reviewed the data. Third, I analyzed the texts and noted statements and descriptions that supported the theories. Fourth, I looked for data that did not support the theories. Fifth, I compared the data to the theories to determine whether there was support for the theories.

**Results**

**Brutalization- Witnessing, Learning, and Experiencing Violence**

The brutalization stage focuses on the teaching and demonstration of violent behavior, which includes threatening, observing, and learning how to use physical force. The perpetrators construct a genocidal script that is ready to put into practice.

The Rwandan genocide was planned for several years. Anti-Tutsi propaganda could be found in the Hutu military newspapers and presented on the radio, and lists of those who were to be killed were also constructed. The perpetrators had practised killing prior to the 1994 genocide; during the earlier civil wars, “various genocidal ‘tests’ were run to check the reaction of the local population, the local officials, the army, and especially the international community” (Verwimp, 2000, p. 356). The Tutsi were blamed for Hutu problems and hatred was taught through imitation and societal information.
Hutu lack of land led to conflict and the Hutu tended to be suspicious of Tutsi. Prisoner Adalbert reported that the genocide had been discussed since 1959 (Hatzfeld, 2003). Clearly, the Hutus learned to hate and fear the Tutsi, and that there were no negative consequences for killing Tutsi during these small-scale massacres. The Hutu were taught that they must use violence toward the Tutsi to avoid becoming victims of the Tutsi. Straus (2006) quotes from one of his perpetrator interviews.

I told you it was anger. When one is angry, one does not think. . .We believed that the Tutsi would come to kill us so we had to kill them first instead of waiting for them to kill us. Me, I saw on television how they kill and I saw it was extreme meanness. (p. 165)

Witness testimony indicated that the genocide was planned over several years by members of the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) political party. For example,

In 1991, the MRND created its own youth wing. The members of the MRND’s youth wing were known as the “Interahamwe”. The youth wing was formed in response to two requirements within the MRND: (a) Sensitizing the youth to politics and (b) Mobilizing the youths. (Prosecutor v. Juvenal Kajelijeli, 2003, paragraph 326)

The Interahamwe in the Mukingo commune under the leadership of the accused from 1991 to July 1994 were: (a) given military training organized by the Accused; (b) distributed weapons and uniforms by the accused which were provided by Joseph Nzirorera; and (c) distributed lists of Tutsis to be eliminated. (Prosecutor v. Juvenal Kajelijeli, 2003, paragraph 330)

To prepare for the genocide,

Politicians solicited Augustin Habiyambere to train young Interahamwe recruits of Hutu ethnic origin for “preparation of the offences.” Augustin Habiyambere was directed by them “to carry out an attack on the enemy” because Rwanda was being attacked by the RPF since 1990 and “[they] should be ready because some day [they] would be attacked.” The Accused and Sendugu Shadrack supervised the training of the Interahamwe youth in the use of weapons, including Kalashnikovs and ML4 rifles. The Witness affirmed that “two military instructors, one from the Mukamira Camp and another former FAR” were present at each training session. A sensitisation meeting was held after each military session to prepare the young militants for combat. (Prosecutor v. Juvenal Kajelijeli, 2003, paragraph 362)
Defiance--Using Violence to Stop Violence

In the defiance stage, the perpetrator group develops a belief system that supports the use of violence to perceived threats. The leaders encourage and reinforce the belief system to justify the use of violence.

According to Fujii (2004), “genocidal leaders had to transform the normative environment such that actions that were once considered verboten (such as killing thy neighbor) could be viewed as not only legitimate but imperative” (pp. 99-100). Fujii described the process of creating a genocidal norm in Rwanda as spreading the genocidal message, preventing contradictory messages, creating events (false threats from Tutsi), and rehearsing (small scale massacres). The leaders had successfully constructed the genocidal message and many Rwandan citizens had internalized the genocidal script that the Tutsi were a threat that had to be eradicated through the only available option; genocide.

Straus (2006) pointed out that, “once a point was reached when those promoting violence consolidated control and once men started killing, they themselves became increasingly violent and demanded conformity from their peers” (p. 89). Consistent with violentization theory, Straus found that perpetrators engaged in violent behavior to protect and defend themselves from the rebels and to avoid punishments for avoiding participation. Whether accurate or not, the Hutu perpetrators were led to believe that they had a choice; to kill or be killed (Straus).

According to prisoner Elie, “on April 10 the burgomaster in a pressed suit and all the authorities gathered us together. They lectured us, they threatened in advance anyone who bungled the job, and the killings began without much planning” (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 15). Straus (2006) reported that one of his respondents explained defiance.

We were told that the plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundi’s president had been shot down. That is when the killings began. People understood that if the head of state is killed first, then the peasants would be next; in other words, that the Tutsi regime was coming back. (p. 155)

In one case, a clergyman refused to assist the Tutsi and encouraged the perpetrators to kill the Tutsi. The clergyman’s actions indicated that he held a belief system that it was permissible and desirable to have Hutu kill Tutsi. I found the following witness testimony in the court transcripts.

From about 12 April 1994, refugees were confined by the gendarmes and surrounded by the militiamen and Interahamwe armed with traditional and conventional weapons. Father Athanase SEROMBA did prevent the refugees from taking food and instructed the gendarmes to shoot any “Inyenzi” (reference to Tutsi) who tried to take some food from the Presbytère or the parish banana groves. He refused to celebrate mass for them and stressed that he didn’t want to do that for the Inyenzi. (Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, 2001, paragraph 12)
Violent Dominant Engagements- Carrying Out Violent Acts

In the violent dominant engagements stage the perpetrators use violent behavior. Once brutalization and defiance have been internalized by the perpetrators the leaders instruct the perpetrators to begin the killings.

Hatzfeld (2003) was able to obtain descriptions of how the perpetrators helped others to learn to kill. The perpetrators reported that using a machete to kill was easy since they often used the machete in their fields. Prisoner Leopold stated, “At the time of those murders I didn’t even notice the tiny thing that would change me into a killer” (Hatzfeld, p. 27). The perpetrators used imitation and repetition to teach their colleagues how to kill. According to prisoner Adalbert, “doing it over and over: repetition smoothed out clumsiness. That is true, I believe, for any kind of handiwork” (Hatzfeld, p. 36).

The perpetrators described their first kill with indifference and that killing became easier with time. According to Li (2004), the radio broadcasts,

helped Rwandans make sense of their active participation in the genocide in terms that were broader than simple hatred or fear of the Tutsi by creating a context in which euphemisms such as “work” and “cockroaches” could be easily understood through an indirectness that left nothing unsaid. (p. 13)

Prisoner Jean-Baptiste described his first kill.

The crowd had grown. I seized the machete, I struck a first blow. When I saw the blood bubble up, I jumped back a step. Someone blocked me from behind and shoved me forward by both elbows. I closed my eyes in the brouhaha and I delivered a second blow like the first. It was done, people approved, they were satisfied and moved away. I drew back…Later on we got used to killing without so much dodging around. (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 23)

Children and adults, males and females, were shown how to kill by the soldiers (Jones, 2002). They were given permission and encouragement to engage in violence. In some cases, they were threatened if they did not take part in the killings.

The killers described becoming crueler with time. They also described that there were no negative consequences for killing and that there might be negative consequences for failing to kill. The killers engaged in sexual violence (e.g., rapes were followed by murder). Adults, infants, and children were killed. Children were also forced to kill others (Hatzfeld, 2003).

According to Kellow and Steeves (1998), Rwandan radio incited much of the genocidal behavior through a kill-or-be-killed framework reporting that “by 1993, political dichotomization was extreme” (p. 115). Kellow and Steeves found that the media was used to encourage racial hatred several years before the genocide occurred. The radio presented false reports of Tutsi attacking, torturing, and killing Hutu. In reference to a popular radio station, Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), Kellow and Steeves stated that,
during the genocide broadcasts, RTLM used several narrative techniques to incite killings. A relentless, “risk and danger,” “kill or be killed” frame, and related “violence” and “victims” frames, emphasizing gruesome consequences of violence for victims, were the most blatant. (p. 124)

Articles and pictures in the leading Kanguru newspaper also contained warnings and statements written to encourage and provide permission to attack the Tutsi. For example,

These writings portrayed the Tutsi as inherently wicked and ambitious in language clearly intended to fan the flames of resentment and anger, directed against the Tutsi population. The cover of Kangura No. 26 answered the question “What weapons shall we use to conquer the Inyenzi once and for all?” with the depiction of a machete. The message conveyed by this cover was a message of violence, that the machete should be used to conquer the Inyenzi once and for all. By Inyenzi, Kangura meant, and was understood to mean, all Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity, who in this issue of Kangura were stereotyped as having the inherent characteristics of liars, thieves and killers. (Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, 2003, paragraph 17)

**Virulency- Violent and Dangerous Selves**

In the virulency stage, the group has defined itself as violent and dangerous. I did find that some of the prisoners disagreed with other prisoners regarding the negative consequences of failing to participate in the genocide. The perpetrators reported that when they became successful killers the encouragement to kill or negative sanctions for avoiding killing were no longer needed. According to prisoner Jean-Baptiste, “We became naturally cruel. We no longer needed encouragement or fines to kill, or even orders or advice. Discipline was relaxed because it wasn’t necessary anymore” (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 74). According to prisoner Pio,

we no longer saw a human being when we turned up a Tutsi in the swamps...this killer was indeed me, as to the offense he committed and the blood he shed, but he is a stranger to me in his ferocity. (pp. 47-48)

The killers, along with their spouses, participated in looting, and had support from neighbors (e.g., food and alcohol). When the killers returned home from a day of killing, they had celebrations that resulted in greater cohesion and positive reinforcement for killing. Additionally, there were killing shows or jamborees in which community members would cheer and shout as they watched the perpetrators slowly kill their victims.

In the clergyman case cited previously, the clergyman congratulated the perpetrators for their violent behavior. This type of behavior could encourage the
perpetrators to define themselves as violent and dangerous and would also help to increase group cohesion and the dehumanization of the victims. The witness explained, that following the 15 April 1994 attacks, Athanase Seromba congratulated some of the assailants by throwing down bottles of beer to them from the “second floor” of the presbytery. The witness testified that he saw Seromba later in the evening at the secretariat, holding a discussion with the Interahamwe and the gendarmes. Seromba allegedly asked them to bring a mechanical digger to remove the bodies strewn on the ground in front of the church. (Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, 2006, paragraph 166)

After the destruction of the church,

the authorities held a meeting in the Parish. Soon after, Father SEROMBA ordered the Interahamwe to clean the “rubbish.” The bodies of victims were placed into common graves. (Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, 2001, paragraph 29)

Mironko (2004) described the killers as hunters who dehumanized the Tutsi to encourage the killings. The Hutu killers were taught by the government that they had a duty to kill Tutsi, as they had killed their families in a previous genocide, and that they would be killed by the Tutsi if they did not kill them first.

Jones (2002) provided an example of Hutu perpetrator virulence stating, their preening swagger rapidly came to terrify even the Hutu general population and the extremist leadership. It typified the pathological machismo that is usually central to the perpetration of genocide, and that the authorities, well aware of its murderous potential, had hoped to channel and control. (p. 76)

**Extreme Virulence- Torture, Rape, and Mass Murder**

This stage has been added to the violentization model to address behavior that went beyond killing the victims and resulted in torture and mutilation. Some of these descriptions share similarities with serial killer profiles. Extreme virulence goes beyond virulence in intensity, severity, and scope of the violent behavior.

Mironko (2004) described a case in which a child observed her father having his head cut open, his nose cut off, his penis cut off, and stuffed in his mouth. Clearly, this is a case of extreme virulence. Some of the perpetrators raped women and girls, forced them into sexual slavery, and then killed them (Des Forges, 1999). Des Forges also reported women being mutilated.

Victim testimony provides more information about the violentization process. In the following case, extreme violence is carried out by several perpetrators belonging to the Interahamwe militia group.
Allegations of sexual violence first came to the attention of the Chamber through the testimony of Witness J, a Tutsi woman, who stated that her six year-old daughter had been raped by three Interahamwe when they came to kill her father. On examination by the Chamber, Witness J also testified that she had heard that young girls were raped at the bureau communal. Subsequently, Witness H, a Tutsi woman, testified that she herself was raped in a sorghum field and that, just outside the compound of the bureau communal, she personally saw other Tutsi women being raped and knew of at least three such cases of rape by Interahamwe. Witness H testified initially that the Accused, as well as commune police officers, were present while this was happening and did nothing to prevent the rapes. (Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, paragraph 416)

Witness JJ testified that the refugees at the bureau communal had been beaten by the Interahamwe and were lying on the ground when she arrived. Witness JJ encountered four Interahamwe outside the bureau communal, armed with knives, clubs, small axes and small hoes. That afternoon, she said, approximately forty more Interahamwe came and beat the refugees, including Witness JJ. At this time she said she saw the Accused, standing in the courtyard of the communal office, with two communal police officers who were armed with guns, one of whom was called Mushumba. Witness JJ said she was beaten on the head, the ribs and the right leg, which left her disabled. That evening, she said, the Accused came with a policeman to look for refugees and ordered the Interahamwe to beat them up, calling them “wicked, wicked people” and saying they “no longer had a right to shelter.” The refugees were then beaten and chased away. Witness JJ said she was beaten by the policeman Mushumna, who hit her with the butt of his gun just behind her ear. (Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, paragraph 419)

Witness JJ testified that often the Interahamwe came to beat the refugees during the day, and that the policemen came to beat them at night. She also testified that the Interahamwe took young girls and women from their site of refuge near the bureau communal into a forest in the area and raped them. Witness JJ testified that this happened to her - that she was stripped of her clothing and raped in front of other people. At the request of the Prosecutor and with great embarrassment, she explicitly specified that the rapist, a young man armed with an axe and a long knife, penetrated her vagina with his penis. She stated that on this occasion she was raped twice. Subsequently, she told the Chamber, on a day when it was raining, she was taken by force from near the bureau communal into the cultural center within the compound of the bureau communal, in a group of approximately fifteen girls and women. In the cultural center, according to Witness JJ, they were raped. She was raped twice by one man. Then another man came to where she was lying and he also raped her. A third man then raped her, she said, at which point she described herself as
feeling near dead. Witness JJ testified that she was at a later time dragged back to the cultural center in a group of approximately ten girls and women and they were raped. She was raped again, two times. Witness JJ testified that she could not count the total number of times she was raped. She said, “each time you encountered attackers they would rape you” - in the forest, in the sorghum fields. Witness JJ related to the Chamber the experience of finding her sister before she died, having been raped and cut with a machete. (Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, paragraph 421)

The Circumplex Model

Rwandan society had unbalanced levels of cohesion and flexibility falling into the rigid and enmeshed patterns (Winton, 2005). The Rwandan hardliners brought together Hutu in order to kill Tutsi (Straus, 2006). The perpetrator group formed highly cohesive interactions with each other and their societal institutions, and presented a rigid leadership pattern. Communication patterns from government officials, community leaders, and radio announcements justified the killings, removed negative sanctions, and defined the victims as dangerous. According to Straus these were ordinary Rwandans who participated in the genocide “because other men encouraged, intimidated, and coerced them to do so in the name of authority and ‘the law’” (p. 122) and because they were fearful of and angry at the Tutsi. This is also consistent with the obedience research of Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo (2007).

The genocide was organized around a rigid schedule of wake up, eat, meet, and kill. Rigid leadership roles also emerged during the organization of the genocide, as prisoner Ignace stated, “suddenly Hutus of every kind were patriotic brothers without partisan discord” (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 16). Hatzfeld also pointed out that the groups of killers met on the soccer field and formed into teams. Many of the perpetrators knew each other and their victims from their community interactions. The threat-based genocidal script was clearly constructed by Hutu leaders. In his analysis of the genocide, Gourevitch (1998) stated,

genocide, after all, is an exercise in community building. . . In 1994, Rwanda was regarded in much of the rest of the world as the exemplary instance of the chaos and anarchy associated with collapsed states. In fact, the genocide was the product of order, authoritarianism, decades of modern political theorizing and indoctrination, and one of the most meticulously administered states in history. (p. 95)

The Hutu Ten Commandments were published in the popular Kangura newspaper, and the author of these commandments provided encouragement and permission to kill Tutsi. The author encouraged the Hutu to become a cohesive group while delineating definitions of the enemy. The following information regarding the Hutu Ten Commandments was obtained from the court transcripts.

The Ten Commandments were published in Kangura No. 6, in December 1990, within an article entitled Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu. The
introduction of this article warned readers: The enemy is still there, among us, and is biding his time to try again, at a more propitious moment, to decimate us. Therefore, Hutu, wherever you may be, wake up! Be firm and vigilant. Take all necessary measures to deter the enemy from launching a fresh attack. (Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, 2003, paragraph 12)

The second part of the article entitled, *The Tutsi Ambition* described the Tutsi as “bloodthirsty,” and referred to their continuing ideology of Tutsi domination over the Hutu, and to the “permanent dream of the Tutsi” to restore Tutsi minority rule. The article referred to a plan of 1962, in which the Tutsi were to resort to two weapons they thought effective against the Hutu; “money and the Tutsi woman.” One part of the article entitled, *The Tutsi Woman* stated that Tutsi women were sold or married to Hutu intellectuals or highly placed Hutu officials, where they could serve as spies in influential Hutu circles and arrange government appointments, issue special import licenses, and pass secrets to the enemy. Another part, which included the The Ten Commandments, exhorted the Hutu to wake up “now or never” and become aware of a new Hutu ideology, with roots in and in defence of the 1959 revolution. Reference was made to the historical servitude of the Hutu, and readers were urged to “be prepared to defend themselves against this scourge.” The Hutu were urged to “cease feeling pity for the Tutsi!” The article then set forth The Ten Commandments (Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, 2003, paragraph 13).

The first commandment warns Hutu men of the dangers of Tutsi women and deems a traitor any Hutu man who marries a Tutsi woman, keeps a Tutsi mistress, or makes a Tutsi woman his secretary or protégée. Another commandment casts as a traitor any Hutu man who enters into business with Tutsi partners, invests his or state money in a Tutsi company, or lends to or borrows from a Tutsi. Other commandments require that strategic political, economic, and military positions be entrusted to the Hutu, that students and teachers should be in the majority Hutu, and that the Hutu be united in solidarity and “seek friends and allies for the Hutu cause.” The ninth commandment concludes, “The Hutu must be firm and vigilant towards their common Tutsi enemy” (Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, 2003, paragraph 14).

The Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu portrayed the Tutsi as a ruthless enemy, determined to conquer the Hutu, and called on the Hutu to take all necessary measures to stop the enemy. Kangura published the 19 Commandments to alert readers to the evil nature of the Tutsi and their intention to take power and subjugate the Hutu. The Ten Commandments of the Hutu and the 19 Commandments of the Tutsi were complementary
efforts to the same end: the promotion of fear and hatred among the Hutu population of the Tutsi minority and the mobilization of the Hutu population against them. This appeal to the Hutu was visibly sustained in every issue of Kangura from February 1991 to March 1994 by the title “The Voice that Awakens and Defends the Majority People.” (Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, 2003, paragraph 16)

Mironko (2004) found from perpetrator interviews that igitero, or group attack, was used as an explanation for genocidal behavior. Mironko also pointed out that group attacks had occurred since 1959, and were based on existing cohesion and a rigid atmosphere that became more intense as the perpetrators became more virulent killers.

The perpetrators were encouraged to develop into a more cohesive and rigid groups through several strategies. For example,

prosecution Witness GDQ testified that on 8 April 1994, the Interahamwe organized a feast at a bar owned by the Accused to congratulate themselves on their victory the day before. The Witness stated that, in the presence of the Accused, they sang a song with the words “Tuzu, tsemba tsembe,” which means to exterminate something you hope to have disappear completely. According to the Witness, when the Interahamwe sang the song they meant persons who were considered the enemies of the country, in other words, the Tutsi-Bigogwe. (Prosecutor v. Juvenal Kajelijeli, 2003, paragraph 707)

**Discussion**

The aim of this study was to determine whether the circumplex model and violentization theory apply to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. I found that using the circumplex model and violentization theory allowed me to show how the perpetrators moved through the violentization process, as their society moved toward a rigid and enmeshed state. I showed that the circumplex model and violentization theory may be used by researchers as a working model, although additional research needs to be conducted.

As Hutu became more fearful of a civil war occurring, some Hutu leaders began to move other Hutu to a rigid and enmeshed group structure. The perpetrator groups became closer and tightly organized, and group loyalty and obedience were required. They became more dependent on one another for direction and feedback regarding their relationships to their Tutsi neighbors. Authoritarian leadership styles became more pronounced, as radio broadcasts became a major mode of authority for information and instructions for action.

Many Hutu had already learned to hate and fear the Tutsi. Several small massacres had taken place without negative consequences for the perpetrators, and the belief that violence toward Tutsi was justified and necessary became part of a cultural norm. Communication patterns encouraging Hutu to kill Tutsi emerged. The perpetrators were shown how to kill and given opportunities to loot. Peer pressure added another
motivating factor to engage in violence. Although there were inconsistencies in this study, some perpetrators reported that they killed to avoid being killed, and this was also reinforced through radio broadcasts. This situation provided two sources of threat to include being killed by Tutsi or killed by Hutu for failing to participate. As the genocide progressed, the perpetrators reported becoming crueler; some perpetrators became extremely violent and tortured and mutilated the victims.

There are several limitations to this study. The application of this model to a single genocide may not generalize to other genocides, and further research would need to be conducted on several additional genocides. The use of secondary sources did not allow me to ask direct questions that might better address the theories. I did not address the process that occurred that led Hutu to avoid killing others and in some cases, helping Tutsi escape the slaughter. I also did not address how a non-violent person moves rapidly to a genocidal person and then back to a non-violent person. Finally, one assumption of the model is that social change is a precursor to genocide. In contrast, Kissi (2004) points out that “genocide and politicide do not necessarily occur in the context of change. They can be products of resistance to change” (p. 130).

The results of this study are congruent with the findings of another study on the Bosnian genocide (Winton & Unlu, 2008). Using the same methods used in this study, we found that we were able to apply the circumplex model and violentization theory to the development and enactment of the Bosnian genocide. There are several similarities between these two genocides. There were previous genocides that had occurred in both countries and were presented by the current genocidal leaders as reasons to fear, hate, and attack the victims. The violentization process had already been put into place by military groups and some of the public as both genocides occurred during civil wars. The media was used in Rwanda and Bosnia to communicate hatred and fear of the victims and to dehumanize them. Finally, both of these cases were coded as rigidly enmeshed during the genocide (Winton & Unlu).

There also are differences between the two genocides. Concentration camps were set up in the Bosnian genocide, but not in the Rwandan case. The Bosnian genocide involved conflict between several religious groups. The Rwandan genocide took place over a period of months, while the Bosnian genocide lasted years (1992-1998).

One reviewer brought to my attention the question of whether or not I needed to use the two theories rather than only one of the theories. This is a very important question. Based on my previous study (Winton, 2005), I found that the circumplex model did not allow me to answer some of my research questions regarding social interaction. In contrast, Rhodes (2002) successfully applied violentization theory to a case study of genocide. Researchers may prefer using violentization theory to explain individual or small group violent behavior during the genocide, while the circumplex model may be more appropriate to be used by researchers to explain the societal dynamics related to the genocide. Additional research is needed to provide a sufficient answer to this question.

Further researchers might use Turner’s (2005) suggestion to take a top down approach and focus more on how the macro factors influence the micro factors. Studying both the ideology and the bureaucracy can lead to a more integrated approach (Porter, 2006). The development of a circumplex society map that follows the patterns developed by Olson (2000) might be helpful in applying the concepts to macro level variables such as the economic, military, and political systems. This would involve developing a new
conceptual procedure for measuring the circumplex model dimensions at the macro level, which might involve qualitative content analysis of text, radio and television broadcasts, and other relevant cultural artifacts.

Ulmer (2003) recommended that further violentization researchers focus on additional testing of the model using a variety of methods, applying the theory to culture and media and violence, and studying the deviolentization process. In addition, Ulmer recommended examining the violentization process in the Rwandan and Yugoslavian genocides.

O’Donnell (2003) provided a critique of Athens’ work and pointed out that there are cases that do not fit the violentization model. For example, military personnel may go through the violentization process but are rarely violent in their civilian lives. In addition, others who do not go through the violentization process may encourage extreme violence (e.g., genocidal bureaucrats). This might lead to further research on different types of violentization. While Athens’ violentization model fits with his sample of violent prisoners, further work needs to be completed on the applications of his theory to larger scale violence (Sanborn, 2003).

I suggest that future researchers use historical-comparative methods focusing on the preconditions, genocide event, and post-genocide event by analyzing common and different aspects of the genocides (Huttenbach, 2004) using the circumplex model and violentization theory. This type of research may encourage other criminal justice professionals to publish research, present at conferences, and teach courses with a focus on genocide.

References


Gourevitch, P. (1998). *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda*. New York: Picador.


Author Note

Correspondences concerning this article should be addressed to Mark A. Winton, Department of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies, P.O. Box 161600, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1600. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to mwinton@mail.ucf.edu.

Copyright 2008: Mark A. Winton and Nova Southeastern University

Article Citation